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there were substantial differences between aid allocation by the government and by 
international aid agencies.  The likelihood of receiving aid from the government was higher 
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but was more likely to go to poorer and easier accessible communes, whether or not they 
were affected by the cyclone. 
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The Political Economy of Relief Aid Allocation:  




Natural disasters often have strong negative and long-lasting impacts on welfare in 
low-income countries.  Governments and aid agencies have been struggling for decades on 
how to appropriately design and implement natural disaster relief programs as to mitigate the 
devastating effects (e.g., World Bank, 2001, 2006).  Recent research suggests that targeting 
of relief is not always effective, for a variety of reasons. One of the key reasons is that, as 
with any government policy, political considerations affect relief aid allocation. Another 
reason is that relief aid allocation may be affected by the costs of aid distribution, which itself 
is a function of local institutions and infrastructure. The nature of the organization in charge 
of the distribution of relief aid may also matter, as local governments or international 
institutions are likely to have different incentive structures.   
However, in contrast to the determinants of aid overall, empirical evidence on the 
importance of these factors in relief aid is still scant (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Burnside 
and Dollar, 2000).  However, understanding the importance of these factors is important 
given the importance of relief aid in the aid budget overall (Hoddinott, 1998) and given the 
desire to more efficiently use these public funds.  The limited empirical literature suggests 
several political economy factors which affect relief aid allocation.  First, the demand for 
assistance and the costs of providing assistance affect relief operations, but not always as 
expected.  In a study of the allocation of natural disaster relief after hurricane Mitch hit 
Honduras in October 1998, Morris and Wodon (2003) find that, while the probability of 
receiving aid at household level was negatively correlated with wealth and positively 
correlated with assets losses, the amount of relief received was independent of these two 
variables. The amount of aid received by households in Nicaragua following hurricane Mitch   3 
was neither related to the degree of losses suffered nor to their pre-Mitch income level (Lazo 
and Santos, 2004).  Looking at how costs related to existing institutions and organizations 
affect the supply of aid, Jayne et al. (2002) find that food aid allocations by the Ethiopian 
government together with local and international non-governmental organizations, displayed 
a large degree of spatial continuity over time which the authors attribute to high fixed costs in 
the set-up of relief operations and in the process of identifying needs.         
Second, Jayne et al. (2001) also find that food aid was being used by the Ethiopian 
government to transfer resources to regions favored by the regime instead of those regions 
most in need. Similar political pressures in the case of emergencies were shown to exist in 
India and Sudan (Plumper and Neumayer, 2009). 
Third, other studies show that mass media can affect the process of aid allocation, in 
particular by governments, as the media enable vulnerable citizens to monitor the actions of 
politicians and to use this information in their lobby activities or voting decisions.
1  Sen 
(1984) attributes a major role to the freedom and independence of the mass media in India in 
explaining why the country has historically avoided famines more successfully than China, 
which lacks free and independent media.  Besley and Burgess (2001, 2002) use panel data on 
public food distribution and calamity relief programs in India to show that a more informed 
electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive.  In their analysis, 
newspaper circulation plays a substantial role in increasing political accountability. Mass 
media has also been identified as an important factor in African countries that succeeded in 
preventing famines (Drèze and Sen, 1990).  The media matters for relief aid in developed 
countries as well.  For example, Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) show, based on data from 
5000 natural disasters in the US, how relief depends on whether a disaster occurs at the same 
time as other newsworthy events. 
                                                 
1 This paper refers to media exposure within the affected regions as opposed to media coverage of the disaster to 
other locations, which might generate additional aid allocations.   4 
The objective of our paper is to contribute to this literature. Using unique primary 
data, our paper studies how various factors affected relief aid allocation to rural communities 
after cyclone Gafilo hit Madagascar in March 2004.  Aid was provided by the Government of 
Madagascar as well as by local and international aid agencies.  The Government provided 
emergency assistance by distributing first aid supplies as water, medication, blankets, shelters 
etc.  The donor agencies mainly organized reconstruction and rehabilitation of public 
infrastructure, partly through cash-for-work programs.   
Our study focuses on the allocation of relief aid to communes.  Data on relief aid and 
community specifics are from a survey of 249 communes at the end of 2004, which we 
combine with various sources of other information such as the population census and the 
commune census as well as alternative measures for the local impact of the cyclone, 
including data on precipitation, satellite and wind speed data as well as the National Disaster 
Management Agency’s (CNS
2) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) impact assessment of the cyclone.   
The paper is organized as follows.  The situation in Madagascar in general and in the 
aftermath of cyclone Gafilo in particular is depicted in Section 2.  Section 3 describes the 
data that we use.  The three determinants of aid allocation decisions, as identified in the 
literature, are discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 describes the econometric model.  Section 6 
presents the results and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Cyclones and Relief in Madagascar 
  Madagascar is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of 
US$320 (World Bank, 2008).  Nearly half of the children under five years of age are 
                                                 
2 The National Disaster Management Agency was referred to in Madagascar as the CNS for ‘Comité National de 
Secours’ at the time of the survey.  It recently changed names to BNGRC for ‘Bureau National de Gestion des 
Risques et des Catastrophes’ which is part of the Ministry of Interior of the Government of Madagascar.    5 
malnourished and the 2008 Human Development Report (UN, 2008) ranks the Indian Ocean 
island 143 out of 179 countries.   
Madagascar is struck by cyclones of varying intensity on an annual basis.  The 
cyclones often cause significant land and infrastructure damage, lead to major decreases in 
economic and especially agricultural output, and bring about severe food insecurity and 
increased poverty for a majority of the Malagasy population.    
 
2.1. Cyclone  Gafilo 
In the first half of March 2004, Madagascar was hit by cyclone Gafilo, the most 
intense cyclone during the last ten years.  It is estimated that 774,000 people were affected by 
the cyclone, of which 308,000 were in need of urgent emergency assistance (World Bank, 
2004).  Gafilo killed 172 people while injuring 879 people and leaving 214,260 without a 
home (Relief Web, 2006).  Over 300,000 hectares of agricultural land was damaged, and 
about 400 schools and health centers were destroyed.  Mid-March 2004, the Government of 
Madagascar declared an emergency and appealed for international assistance (European 
Commission, 2004).   
One of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ main 
tasks is the coordination of humanitarian emergency responses (OCHA, 2006).  As part of 
this assignment, OCHA – in collaboration with the National Disaster Management Agency 
(CNS) of Madagascar – assessed the damage and created a cyclone impact code that ranges 
from 0 to 3.  Zero stands for no cyclone damage, 1 for moderate damage, 2 for serious 
damage, and 3 for very serious cyclone damage.  OCHA defines combinations of (a) damage 
to or the loss of certain infrastructure as houses, roads etc., (b) children who are unable to 
attend school due to damaged school buildings, (c) the loss of agricultural or other income   6 
sources, (d) isolation due to flooding, (e) exposure to epidemics, (f) need of emergency 
assistance as water, food, medication etc. due to a cyclone as cyclone damage.   
Data were collected and compiled by CNS, which is part of the Ministry of Interior.  
CNS gathered information from local authorities at district and commune level.  Annex A.1 
illustrates the impact of cyclone Gafilo in Madagascar, according to estimations made by 
OCHA and CNS on the 15
th of March 2004.  The circles illustrate the number of persons 
affected.   
After OCHA’s mission to Madagascar, CNS continued to alter the cyclone impact 
map according to updated news from the field.  The changes mainly consisted of assigning 
more districts and communes to the moderate impact zone 1.  Annex A.2. depicts the final 
impact assessment map made by CNS.  Further in this paper we will merge both impact 
assessment maps with rainfall data from 15 weather stations across the country.  We will also 
introduce an additional Cyclone Path impact dummy based on wind speed and satellite data. 
Overall, the northern and western parts of Madagascar were “very seriously” to 
“seriously” hit by the natural disaster, while the south-eastern part did not experience heavy 
losses.  Table 1(a) illustrates the CNS cyclone impact codes for the 249 communes in our 
sample.  Seventy-eight percent was classified by CNS as having suffered cyclone damage.  
Fifteen percent suffered a ‘serious’ or ‘very serious’ impact. 
 
2.2.  Relief after cyclone Gafilo 
In the aftermath of cyclone Gafilo, the Government of Madagascar and the national 
and international donor community were committed to support the country in dealing with 
the humanitarian crisis and in rebuilding its infrastructure.  The government – with financial 
support from OCHA and the United Nations – mainly provided emergency assistance by 
distributing food and first aid supplies such as water, drugs, blankets, shelters, etc.   7 
(Government of Madagascar, 2004; UN, 2004).  In some parts of the country, the government 
also assisted in the reconstruction of public infrastructure as schools, health centers etc.   
Targeting by the government was solely based on the CNS impact assessment.  With this 
information at hand, the government sent aid to the most affected districts and communes.  
However, little is known about the actual decision rules and their implementation.   
In a first stage, aid was supposed to be sent to the local communities by the 
government.  The second stage of selecting beneficiary households occurred after commune-
level allocations had been determined.  According to our interviews, local-level responsibility 
for selecting disaster relief beneficiaries was delegated to the decentralized levels i.e. the 
commune representatives.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that – depending on the scope of the 
damage in the commune – first aid supplies where handed out randomly in some communes 
while in others they were allocated to certain households according to eligibility criteria.  
Unfortunately, as we are not in the possession of household data, we cannot analyze the 
second stage allocation, so our analyses solely focus on the first stage of the decision process.         
The donor community that was directly involved with the implementation of relief 
programs (in contrast to the UN who transferred money to the government and it was up to 
the government to decide where to allocate the aid) mainly consisted of the Development 
Intervention Fund (FID
3), sponsored by the World Bank, and international and national 
humanitarian or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, 
SAHAFA etc.  Part of the local NGOs was already operating in the affected regions prior to 
cyclone Gafilo.  There is extensive evidence that all aforementioned aid organizations 
cooperated as to reach the affected population.  Targeting was based on the CNS impact 
assessments as well as extra information from the agencies’ personnel field visits in 
combination with cyclone impact information from the local partners in the field.  The donor 
group mainly organized reconstruction and rehabilitation of public infrastructure, partly 
                                                 
3 FID i.e. Fonds d’Intervention  pour le Développement.    8 
through cash-for-work programs, to assist in the immediate reconstruction of schools, health 
centers, and critical infrastructure, and in the longer term, to rebuild infrastructure to 
withstand future cyclones (World Bank, 2004).
4   
Within these cash-for-work (HIMO
5) programs, local beneficiaries were employed at 
a certain wage to carry out simple maintenance and rehabilitation works (clearing streets, 
canals etc.).  On average, the daily wage was equivalent to 1 USD and the programs were in 
effect for two months after the cyclone.  Labor was not expected to be skilled (Minten et al., 
2005).  A self-targeting mechanism was in place meaning that households decided 
themselves whether to send members to work in the HIMO programs at the offered wage.  
While there is evidence that the local and international aid agencies collaborated to ensure 
coverage of the affected areas and to avoid overlap, our interviews suggest that no formal 
arrangements were made between the government and the aid agencies to target specific 
areas.  Nevertheless, informal agreements could have been made either at the central or 
decentralized levels.  In the end, the success of targeting will be determined by who received 
aid and who did not.  Hence, we will first conduct our analyses on total relief (provided by 
the government and/or the aid agencies) and afterwards investigate relief from both sources 
separately.   
  Table 1 shows that the central government and the aid agencies were the main 
providers of relief in the aftermath of Gafilo.  The government and the aid agencies 
intervened in 37% and 50% of the communes considered as affected by CNS respectively.  
Ten percent of the communes received relief from other, mainly small-scale private donors as 
the local church, or from other sources.  In the remainder of this paper we will focus on the 
first two types of relief i.e. allocated by the government or aid agencies.   
 
                                                 
4 Some NGOs also provided first aid supplies although these cases were very limited in scope. 
5 In Madagascar, cash-for-work programs are referred to as HIMO (Haute Intensité de Main-d’Oeuvre) 
programs.   9 
3. Data   
3.1. Data  collection 
To evaluate aid allocations in the aftermath of cyclone Gafilo and its determinants, a 
primary survey was organized by the USAID-funded Ilo project in collaboration with 
FOFIFA
6 from October through December 2004 in 292 communes.
7,8  The stratified 
sampling frame of the survey was set up to be representative of the situation at the regional 
level.
9  In each commune, a focus group was gathered which was representative of the 
population of the commune.  Participants in the focus groups included in most cases 
representatives of the administration, health workers, teachers and peasants.  On average, 
there were around 10 participants in each group.  The enumerators were well trained in 
structured group interview methods given their extensive experience collecting data with the 
Ilo project in Madagascar.       
 
3.2. Impact  assessments 
Before formulating any results based on cyclone impact evaluations, our first task is 
to verify whether the various impact assessments are unbiased and thus related to weather 
reports at the time of the cyclone.  A tropical cyclone is officially defined as ‘a storm system 
characterized by a low pressure center and thunderstorms, producing flooding rains and 
strong wind’ (NOAA, 2006).  To be able to verify the accuracy of the impact assessments 
made by OCHA and CNS, we collected precipitation data from 15 weather stations across 
Madagascar.  The location of the stations is depicted in Annex A.3.  The data were collected 
and compiled by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia.   
                                                 
6 FOFIFA is the National Agricultural Research Centre within the Ministry of Scientific Research. 
7 The survey was financed by the World Bank. For more information, see Minten et al. (2005). 
8 Out of 1600 communes in total in 2004, i.e. around 20% of the communes. 
9 To ensure geographical coverage, all administrative regions/districts in the country were visited. The number 
of communes that were visited within a region was dependent on the relative size of the rural population in that 
region.  However, a lower bound was fixed of two communes per region.     10  
Consistent with CRU’s methodology, we consider the rainfall data per station to be valid for 
the entire district the station is located in.  Precipitation variation was measured as the 
percentage of rainfall in March 2004, i.e. at the time of cyclone Gafilo compared to the 
rainfall one year earlier in March 2003.  We can assume that the latter reflected a regular 
climatic year as the 2003 precipitation data were found to be consistent with long-term 
rainfall data according to another independent weather organization, i.e. World Climate 
(World Climate, 2004).  Table 2 shows the correlation between the different impact codes 
and the precipitation data at district level.
10   
We find a significant correlation between the precipitation data and the CNS impact 
code that ranges from 0 to 3.  However, the correlation is not found to be significant for the 
OCHA impact code.  To further test the reliability of the CNS impact assessment, we 
continue our analyses with the latter and find that the precipitation variation is mainly 
consistent with the CNS impact assessments of the regions without an impact or the regions 
that were seriously to very seriously hit as illustrated in Table 3.  The marginal effect of the 
precipitation variation (Precipitation) on the regions defined as moderately hit by CNS is 
negative (Column 2; Outcome 1) indicating that CNS’s assessment could have been 
influenced by other factors than weather and cyclone damage reports in their assignment of 
certain regions to the moderate impact zone.
11  Anecdotal evidence from the field supports 
this view that part of the areas in impact zone 1 did not suffer (not even moderately) from 
cyclone Gafilo.
12   
Based on this information we construct two dummy variables of which the CNS Any 
Impact Dummy equals one if the areas were considered by CNS as moderately to very 
seriously hit (i.e. impact codes 1 to 3); and zero otherwise.  The CNS Serious Impact Dummy 
                                                 
10 Each of the 15 districts with rainfall data had uniform CNS/OCHA impact assessments within the district. 
11 Alternatively, it might also be that cyclone damage was falsely reported and CNS did not verify the 
accurateness of the information submitted by the district and commune authorities. 
12 One could argue that there is some threshold of impact, but we believe it is plausible to assume that there is a 
linear relationship between precipitation and impact.   11  
equals one if the areas were assigned as seriously to very seriously hit (i.e. impact codes 2 to 
3); and zero otherwise.  Consistent with our expectations, we find the Serious Impact Dummy 
to be significantly related with precipitation variation in contrast to the Any Impact Dummy as 
shown in Table 2.  Table 3 shows that a 10% increase in rainfall variation increased the 
likelihood of an assessment of a positive cyclone impact by the Serious Impact Dummy by 2 
percentage points.  As the results in Tables 2 and 3 support the use of the Serious Impact 
Dummy as an exogenous measure to needs for intervention, we will continue our analyses 
with the latter.            
However, CNS could have assigned areas to the moderate impact zones that did not 
suffer from heavy rainfall, but that suffered from strong winds.  To check the robustness of 
our results we construct a second impact variable based on wind speed data and satellite 
images of the cyclone path.  The data are obtained from UNISYS.  We took into account the 
characteristics of the asymmetric circulation associated with tropical cyclone motion (Chan 
and Cheung, 1998) to construct the variable which we will refer to as the Cyclone Path 
(Impact) Dummy.  The variable equals one if the commune was hit by the cyclone according 
to the cyclone path (wind and satellite) data; and zero otherwise.  All areas that CNS assigned 
as seriously to very seriously hit by cyclone Gafilo were confirmed to be hit according to our 
path measure and take value one.  Furthermore, 21 communes were added as they were 
affected according to the path measure.  As illustrated in Table 2, the Cyclone Path Dummy is 
highly significantly correlated with precipitation variation.  Map A.4. in Annex depicts 
cyclone Gafilo’s path as well as the CNS Serious Impact measure.   
 
3.3.  Aid allocation       12  
In total, we are in the possession of relief data on 249 out of the 292 communes from 
our sample.
13  Overall, 15% and 23% of them was hit according to the first (Serious Impact 
Dummy) and second (Cyclone Path Dummy) impact assessment respectively.  Our results 
indicate that approximately three-quarters (77%) of the communes hit according to the 
Cyclone Path Dummy received relief from the government and/or the aid agencies.   
Moreover, the probability of assistance was higher in areas with cyclone damage as 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.  Of the 249 communes in our sub-sample, 37 communes were 
classified by CNS as having suffered serious to very serious cyclone damage.
14  Eighty-four 
percent of those communes received relief: 49% received government aid and 73% aid 
agency relief.
15   
Overall, there is a significant correlation between the two relief programs and 18% of 
our sample received both types of relief.  Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrate that the probability 
of assistance increased with the severity of cyclone damage in a consistent way.  Of the 
communes with very serious cyclone damage, 57% benefited from government assistance 
and 86% from aid agency relief.  
There is an extensive literature on the efficiency of targeting mechanisms (e.g., 
Cornia and Stewart, 1995; Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999; Ravallion, 2000; Bigman et al., 
2000; Coady et al., 2004).  In general, there are two types of mistakes to which any targeted 
intervention may be subject.  The first is that of failing to reach the affected population.  
Cornia and Stewart (1995) define this as an F-mistake, that is, a failure in the primary 
objective of the intervention.
16  The second type of mistake is referred to by Cornia and 
                                                 
13 There are no systematic patterns in the reasons for the missing data and there is no link with the cyclone 
impact. 
14 According to our focus groups on average 85% of the households in these communes suffered from damages 
to their agricultural output or personal goods.  Moreover, at the time of the survey i.e. approximately 8 months 
after the cyclone, a majority of the respondents declared not to have fully recovered yet. 
15 As aforementioned, government assistance mainly consisted of the distribution of food (75%) and first aid 
supplies (70%).  In a quarter of the communes the government also assisted in the reconstruction of public 
infrastructure. 
16 An F-mistake can also be referred to as a type I error or U-mistake (e.g., Coady et al., 2004).     13  
Stewart (1995) as an E-mistake
17 as it is the mistake made when the intervention reaches the 
non-target population and hence it involves excessive coverage.  Our data which are based on 
aid allocations at the community level illustrate an F-mistake of 16% meaning that one-sixth 
of the seriously to very seriously affected communes did not receive relief from the 
government or the aid agencies after cyclone Gafilo.  A rough estimate indicates that this 
involves approximately 121.000 people.  On the other hand, our findings depict an E-mistake 
of 25% meaning that more than half of the non-affected communes (with a CNS impact 
assessment equal to zero) received relief after cyclone Gafilo.
18  Looking at the results based 
on the Cyclone Path Dummy in greater detail, we find that 23% of our sample suffered from 
cyclone damage (Table 1).  Of these communes, approximately one quarter (23%) did not 
receive government or aid agency relief and 17% did not receive any help.
19   
Table 4 illustrates the geographical distribution of relief in the aftermath of cyclone 
Gafilo.  The data demonstrate strong provincial differences.  A high 67% of the communes in 
the central province of Antananarivo received relief while there was no commune in that 
province suffering from serious to very serious cyclone damage both according to the impact 
assessments by CNS as well as the precipitation, satellite and wind data.  This compares to 
only 77% of the communes in the western province of Mahajanga receiving aid while almost 
the entire province suffered from heavy destruction.  The regional variations in our findings 
suggest that relief was not only provided according to cyclone damage, but was also 
influenced by other factors. 
In the following sections we first develop a series of hypotheses on the determinants 
of aid allocations and afterwards we discuss the formal econometric analysis.   
                                                 
17 An E-mistake can also be referred to as type II error or L-mistake (e.g., Coady et al., 2004).   
18 We do not consider the communes in the CNS impact zone 1 in these calculations due to aforementioned 
problems. 
19 Finally, as aforementioned we do not possess household data and hence are not able to calculate F- or E-
mistakes within communes, but distribution within communes could be another source of both types of error. 
   14  
 
4.  Hypotheses on Determinants of Relief Aid Allocation  
In this paper we do not attempt to develop a theoretical political economy model to 
formalize hypotheses on the determinants of relief aid allocation.  Instead, we draw on the 
literature to forward a series of hypotheses on the incentives for governments and aid 
agencies to deliver assistance (e.g., Besley and Burgess, 2002; Morris and Wodon, 2003; 
Lazo and Santos, 2004).   
First, our most straightforward hypothesis relates to the demand for relief assistance.  
One should expect the probability of aid to increase with the cyclone impact, i.e. that those 
who suffered most have the highest probability of receiving assistance.   
Second, the cost of providing relief assistance will also affect the incentives to 
provide assistance.  The cost of relief aid provision is related to the institutional and 
infrastructural capacity of the affected regions where the aid has to be delivered, and with 
access to the target population.  For example, Besley and Burgess (2002) argue that highly 
populated or more densely populated communes are more capable of responding to shocks as 
these characteristics increase the ease of reaching the affected population, or in other words, 
reduce the cost per capita of the target population.  On the other hand, geographical isolation 
or remoteness is expected to decrease the ease of reaching target populations.   
Third, richer communes are expected to have more developed response mechanisms 
as they have more financial means to develop and invest in such mechanisms.  This, ceteris 
paribus, reduces the costs for governments and aid organizations to provide relief aid.  
Fourth, relief aid is a highly visible policy and hence it is very attractive  for 
politicians to use for political purposes, such as targeting relief aid to groups of the 
populations from which they obtain political support – or expect to do so in the future.  For 
example, Jayne et al. (2001) find evidence that the allocation of food aid was used by the   15  
Ethiopian government to transfer resources to “politically favored regions”.  In line with this 
argument (e.g. Moser, 2008), one might expect the Government of Madagascar to transfer 
resources to favored regions.  On the other hand, one of the main priorities of the Malagasy 
government at the time of the cyclone was to achieve better governance which, if 
implemented, would predict less politicization of relief operations.   
Fifth, several recent studies show the importance of free and independent media as a 
key factor in ensuring protection for the poor and vulnerable (e.g., Drèze and Sen, 1990; 
Stapenhurst, 2000; Besley and Burgess, 2001, 2002; World Bank, 2002; Strömberg, 2004; 
Reinikka and Svensson, 2004, 2005).  In particular, governments and politicians tend to favor 
informed citizens for two reasons: not only are well-informed citizens more likely to vote 
than uninformed ones, but they are also more likely to vote for those candidates who further 
their interests (World Bank, 2002).  Hence, our final hypothesis is that an electorate better 
informed by mass media strengthens incentives for a government to be responsive and 
therefore, we expect the likelihood of government relief to be higher in communes with better 
media access.   
The impact of some of several of these factors is likely to be different for 
governments in providing aid than for independent aid organizations.  For example, we do 
not expect aid agency relief to be similarly influenced by the media as re-election incentives 
are absent.  Hence, estimating the impact of the indicator variables for relief aid provided by 
the government and by independent aid organizations will provide additional insights on the 
importance of these various hypotheses.  
 
5. Econometric  Model 
  The empirical estimation includes one model with three definitions of the dependent 
variable.  The first dependent variable is defined as a dummy variable with value one if the   16  
commune received relief from the government and/or the aid agencies in the aftermath of 
cyclone Gafilo; and zero otherwise.  The second dependent variable equals one if the 
commune received emergency assistance from the government; and zero otherwise.  The 
third dependent variable takes value one if the commune received relief from the aid agencies 
after Gafilo; and zero otherwise.  All dependent variables are commune-specific measures 
and the empirical model is of the following form:  
    c c c c c c c q i q k i y ε γ δ β α + + + + = ) ( ) (              (1) 
where yc represents the dependent variable, ic captures the need for intervention, kc is a 
matrix of provincial dummy variables to determine fixed effects not captured by the other 
explanatory variables, and εc refers to the error term.  Furthermore, our model identifies a 
vector qc of economic, media, and political variables that we might expect to affect aid 
allocation decisions (yc).  The qc variables enter two times i.e. as level terms, and interacted 
with the variable that captures the need for intervention. 
  As indicator for the need for intervention after cyclone Gafilo hit Madagascar in 
March 2004, we use both the (CNS) Serious Impact Dummy and the Cyclone Path Dummy, 
for the aforementioned reasons.  We expect the probability of both government and aid 
agency relief to be higher in areas with cyclone damage implying a higher need for 
intervention.   
The variable Pop_dens measures the population density in the commune.  The 
average household expenditures per commune per month are determined by Mean_exp.
20  As 
discussed earlier, we might expect more densely populated or richer communes to have more 
developed response mechanisms.   
Remoteness quantifies the geographical isolation of the communes and is measured by 
a commune remoteness index – developed by Stifel et al. (2003) – that is the outcome of a 
                                                 
20 Data are obtained from the Madagascar poverty map developed by the World Bank (Mistiaen et al., 2002).   17  
factor analysis of various isolation measures collected in the commune census of 2001.
21  By 
construction, the index permits us to rank communes by degree of isolation (Stifel et al., 
2003).  Given the general lack of infrastructure in Madagascar, our hypothesis is that 
remoteness decreases the ease of reaching target populations.  This hypothesis is consistent 
with the finding of Francken et al. (2009) that remoteness increases capture of public 
education funds by local officials, because of a lack of top-down monitoring i.e. by the 
central authorities in more remote areas. 
Despite the fact that communities could be remotely situated from a hospital, a school 
etc. they could still have a taxi-bus transport facility and are therefore easier accessible 
compared to other remote areas without this facility.  To control for this, we include the 
variable Transport_facility in our analyses which equals one if there is a taxi-bus service in 
the commune; and zero otherwise.  The privately run taxi-buses are the main means of 
transport in urban as well as rural areas of Madagascar and could be an indication for the 
accessibility of the commune.  Our hypothesis is that the likelihood of relief is higher in areas 
with a taxi-bus transport facility.  
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 5.  The average population density of the 
communes in our sample equals 190 inhabitants per square kilometers.  However, there are 
large variations, with a maximum population density of 7,050 inhabitants per square 
kilometers.  The average household expenditures per commune per month equal 301,170 
Malagasy Francs.  This is equivalent to approximately 60,200 Malagasy Ariary or 28 USD.
22  
The median remoteness index equals -0.28, with the lowest geographical isolation at -0.66 
and the highest at 6.85.  Half of the communes in our sample have a taxi-bus transport 
facility.     
                                                 
21 Distances to health facilities, banks, schools, courts, input markets, agricultural extension services, 
veterinarians. 
22 The Malagasy Franc was replaced by the Malagasy Ariary on January 1, 2005.  Our data are consistent with 
the fact that more than 70% of the Malagasy population lives under the national poverty line (World Bank, 
2004).   18  
To estimate the impact of mass media we use several indicators.  The three main 
sources of mass media communication in Madagascar are radio, television, and newspapers 
(Francken et al., 2009).  Radio is the most common and important means of communication, 
especially in rural areas.  The National Household Survey of 1997 (INSTAT, 1997) showed 
that 45% of all households are in the possession of a radio and according to the Commune 
Census of 2001 (Cornell University, 2001), approximately half of all communes (48%) has 
access to a regional radio outlet.  This compares to 18% which has access to regional 
television.  According to a recent study of Andriantsoa et al. (2005) only 6% of the Malagasy 
population reads a newspaper.  Newspaper circulation is concentrated mostly in urban areas, 
and few newspapers are available in remote and rural areas.  Moreover, illiteracy rates are 
high in these areas.
23   
Therefore, in this paper we focus on radio access instead of newspapers.  More 
specifically, we use the variable Radio_coverage as indicator of access to mass media. This 
variable measures the percentage of the commune population listening to the radio in 
November 2001, according to estimations of the focus groups.  First, using radio coverage 
rather than an indicator whether there is a radio station (or the number of radios) is more 
likely to be an accurate measure of access to mass media, since there is no obvious 
relationship between the (number of) radios and its audiences in villages in Madagascar.  
Second, to avoid endogeneity problems, we use a media variable which captures the radio 
coverage situation prior to the cyclone.  Cyclone Gafilo hit Madagascar in 2003 and our 
survey took place eight months later.  It is plausible that the government or aid organizations 
provided assistance by setting up media stations in the aftermath of the cyclone in order to get 
information out to the affected regions.  Given that the president of Madagascar is the owner 
                                                 
23 Concerning press freedom, Freedom House ranked the media in Madagascar during the last five years as 
‘partly free’ (Freedom House, 2005).     
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of one of the private media companies in the country
24 and put considerable efforts in starting 
up radio stations all over the country, also in the aftermath of cyclone Gafilo, it could be that 
taking into account media access at the time of our survey would induce endogeneity 
problems.   
  On average, 47% of the population in the communes listened to the radio in 2001.  
Table 6 illustrates the degree of variation of radio coverage between and within the six 
provinces of Madagascar.  Overall, radio coverage varies considerably between and within 
provinces.  Historically, media activity was concentrated in the central province of 
Antananarivo (Andriantsoa et al., 2005).  In recent years, external investments often through 
support from international non-governmental organizations, as e.g. the Andrew Lees Trust 
Fund, made radio access as well as radios available even in extremely remote and poor areas 
with low population density.   
  In order to investigate the impact of mass media – in particular on government aid 
allocation – in greater detail we asked the communal focus groups three hypothetical 
questions which are depicted in Table 7.  The answers to these questions are not used as 
indicators in the regressions, but show that media matters to the people as on the first 
question a high 71% of the respondents answered to believe that, in case of a cyclone, the 
media and in particular the radio would probably report on the local cyclone impact.  On the 
second question, whether they would go to the media themselves to report problems, a vast 
majority (82%) of the communes reported that they would probably do so.  We further asked 
the communal focus groups on their perception of the impact of the media on government 
responsiveness, in case of a cyclone.  Only 9% of the communes perceived that there would 
probably be no impact of the mass media on government responsiveness.  Yet, half of the 
communes believe that the media would probably influence political decisions and improve 
                                                 
24 The current president, Marc Ravalomanana, is the owner of Malagasy Broadcasting System (MBS).  His firm 
broadcasts on radio as well as television.   20  
responsiveness.  Large differences are noticed between provinces.  In general, the differences 
are in line with the differences in radio coverage.  Based on earlier studies as well as the 
findings from our interviews, our hypothesis is that mass media, in particular radio coverage, 
increase the probability of government relief in the aftermath of natural shocks. 
Our remaining hypotheses relate to the political situation in Madagascar at the time of 
cyclone Gafilo.  Achieving better responsiveness to citizens’ needs as a means of enhancing 
the well-being of the poor has been one of the main priorities of the Malagasy government
25 
which took office in June 2002.  Previously, Madagascar was characterized by low 
government accountability (e.g., Marcus, 2004; Transparency International, 2004; Kaufmann 
et al., 2005).
26  President Marc Ravalomanana promised a positive change towards good 
governance and improved activism and responsiveness.   
To measure whether there was any bias towards communes which politically 
supported the government, we include the variable Major_president, which is a dummy 
variable with value one if more than half of the electorate voted for  Marc Ravalomanana 
during the presidential elections in 2001.  Overall, he won with absolute majority in 36% of 
the communes (Table 5).  It is reasonable to believe our variable is a reliable reflection of the 
political situation at the time of the cyclone i.e. approximately one and a half year after his 
appointment.   
Finally, about half of the Malagasy population is Christian, evenly divided between 
Roman Catholics and Protestants.  Many of the Christian churches are influential in politics.  
The best example of this is the Reformed Protestant Church of Jesus Christ (FJKM
27).  
During the 2001 presidential campaign, FJKM supported Ravalomanana in his successful bid 
                                                 
25 This priority is stated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of Madagascar. 
26 Kaufmann et al. (2005) present a set of governance indicators covering 209 countries over the period 1996-
2004.  The indicators capture six key dimensions of institutional quality or governance as among other things 
government effectiveness.  In 2002, an estimated 60% of the total sample of countries showed better 
government effectiveness than Madagascar. 
27 Fiagonan’i Jesoa Kristy eto Madagasikara.   21  
for president.  The latter’s position as a lay Vice President of FJKM still generates some 
political criticism alleging church and state interests are not kept entirely separate (U.S. 
Embassy in Antananarivo, 2004).  The variable Protestant equals the percentage of 
Protestants i.e. members of FJKM in the commune in 1990, according to the focus groups 
during our field work in 2004.  Measuring the percentage of Protestants more than 10 years 
before the presidential elections in 2001 reduces potential endogeneity and correlation 
problems.  Table 5 illustrates that on average there were 29% Protestants in the communes in 
our sample, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 90%.  Consistent with the 
incumbent’s promises, our hypothesis is that the government provided emergency assistance 
independent from religion.  Aid agency assistance is expected to be neutral and hence not to 
be influenced by electoral support nor religion.     
 
6.  Results  
6.1.  Determinants of relief after cyclone Gafilo 
We will first investigate the allocation of total aid, by the government as well as the 
aid agencies in the aftermath of cyclone Gafilo.  Later, we will investigate whether there are 
differences in determinants of relief from the government and relief from aid agencies 
separately.   
To address the problem of any kind of intra-district correlation and arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity, we use robust standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the 
districts.  In addition, we examine the conditioning of the matrix of independent variables 
following Besley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980).  If this number is large, there may be collinearity 
problems.  Our conditioning value equals on average 16, below the threshold value of 30 
suggested by Besley et al. (1980) implying that there are no important collinearity problems.  
The results are shown in Tables 8 to 12.     22  
The first column of Table 8 shows that the likelihood of relief was significantly higher 
in communes with a higher need for intervention as measured by the Serious Impact dummy 
or by the Cyclone Path variable (Column 4).  The findings suggest that living in a commune 
hit by the cyclone increased the probability of receiving cyclone relief by between 36 and 41 
percentage points.  Both relief from the government (Columns 1 and 4 of Table 10) as well as 
from the aid agencies (Columns 1 and 4 of Table 11) was higher in cyclone-affected areas.  
This result is as expected as both were supposed to target their interventions to cyclone-
affected communities.  Our findings are further robust when we use the third indicator of 
need, i.e. precipitation data from the smaller sub-sample of 47 communes that are situated in 
the 15 districts with weather stations’ information (Table 9).   
We next discuss results that concentrate on the level effects.  These effects represent 
determinants of relief unconditional on need after cyclone Gafilo.  They may measure 
responses to shocks or damage not captured by our cyclone impact variables.  However, they 
are more likely capturing the impacts of determinants of aid allocation, other than cyclone 
impact.   
The results in Column 2 of Table 8 indicate that the likelihood of receiving relief was 
found to be higher in poorer areas as the coefficient of the variable Mean_Exp is highly 
significant with a negative sign, ceteris paribus.  However, this effect is conditional on the 
impact of the cyclone, as can be seen from the results when including the interaction effects 
as shown in Columns 3 and 5 of Table 8.  We find that, for the areas where there was no 
impact of the cyclone, relief aid was more likely to go to poorer areas.  However, for the 
areas where there was an impact, relief aid was more likely to go to richer areas (Columns 3 
and 5 of Table 11).  Interestingly, these results for total relief aid are caused particularly by 
the aid agencies activities.  As can be seen from Columns 3 and 5 of Table 10, the conditional 
effects are not found to be significant for government aid.  In contrast, these effects are very   23  
significant for the regression of aid agencies relief where average wealth in the commune had 
an important impact on donor relief aid with opposite effects in cyclone affected areas and 
elsewhere (see Columns 3 and 5 of Table 11).   
In results not reported in the tables, we found that the result that relatively wealthier 
communities in cyclone-hit areas received more aid from donors is not driven by the fact that 
certain NGOs were already active in specific areas.  The findings seem to suggest that 
consistent with our hypothesis, the donor agencies targeted aid to relatively richer communes 
probably due to the fact that the latter have better developed response mechanisms, for 
example, because they have more financial means to develop and invest in infrastructure, 
storage facilities, systems of distribution etc.   
In contrast, our field interviews suggest that the result that, in regions not affected by 
the cyclone, poorer communes were more likely to receive aid, could be due to the fact that 
this relief was provided by non-governmental organizations that were already active in 
certain poorer areas of Madagascar before March 2004.  The latter organizations were asked 
to cooperate in the donor relief operations after Gafilo while they were not situated in the 
cyclone-affected areas and were not able to move their operations to those areas due to 
budget constraints or other reasons.   
The results also indicate that accessibility matters for relief allocation.  Column 2 of 
Table 8 suggests that, unconditional on cyclone damage, relief was allocated to easier 
accessible communities i.e. those with a taxi-bus transport facility.  The result is valid for 
both government (Column 2 of Table 10) as well as donor relief (Column 2 of Table 11).  
The findings remain robust when including the interaction effects (Columns 3 and 5 of Tables 
8, 10 and 11).  More specifically, the results suggest that living in a commune with a taxi-bus 
service increased the probability of receiving relief after Gafilo by 31 percentage points at the 
means of all other variables (Column 5 of Table 8).  Considering general budget limitations   24  
of relief operations, our findings seem to indicate that non-affected, but easier accessible 
communities received aid at the expense of affected ones.         
Turning to the mass media variables, we find that there was no unconditional impact 
of mass media coverage on relief. However, mass media played a significant role in cyclone 
affected regions.  The likelihood of relief was higher in cyclone-affected areas with higher 
radio coverage as the interaction variable Impact*Radio_coverage enters significantly with a 
positive sign (Columns 3 and 5 of Table 8).  Interestingly, we find that this effect is only 
significant for the allocation of relief by the government as it was significantly higher in 
cyclone-affected areas with radio coverage (Columns 3 and 5 of Table 10) and not for relief 
allocated by donor agencies which do not appear to have been influenced by the mass media 
(Columns 3 and 5 of Table 11).   
For government relief, in results not reported in the tables, we calculated that living in 
a commune where a majority of the population has radio access increased the probability of 
government relief after Gafilo by 24 percentage points (at the means of all other variables).  
These findings are consistent with our hypothesis and earlier qualitative results that citizens 
better informed by mass media strengthen incentives for governments to respond, thus 
emphasizing the importance of the development of regional media outlets as to stimulate 
government action.         
Votes and political preferences also seem to have played a role in the provision of 
relief.  There is no impact of the political support for the government, measured by commune 
votes for the president, unconditional on the cyclone impact.  However, in areas which were 
hit by the cyclone, the probability of relief was higher in communes with a majority of votes 
for president Ravalomanana during the elections of 2001 (Column 5 of Table 8).  This result 
is driven by the government’s aid allocation decisions in the aftermath of cyclone Gafilo, and 
not those of the donors.  The results in Column 5 of Table 10 indicate that living in a   25  
commune with a majority of votes for the incumbent at the time of the 2001 elections 
increased the likelihood of receiving government relief by 37 percentage points at the means 
of all other variables.  Aid from the donor agencies did not appear to be determined by this 
factor (Columns 3 and 5 of Table 11).   
Several explanations for this observation are possible.  On the one hand, communes 
with stronger political support for the incumbent may have stronger belief in the government 
and hence are more likely to report problems and request assistance.  On the other hand, the 
finding could indicate that the Malagasy government targeted aid to favored regions which 
could indicate that emergency aid was used as a highly visible and hence politicized means of 
reacting to natural shocks.   The latter interpretation is consistent with findings on public food 
distribution during periods of famines in other countries (e.g. Jayne et al., 2001; Besley and 
Burgess, 2002).  This issue deserves further research.    
Finally, more densely populated or less remote areas or areas with a higher percentage 
of Protestants do not show to have had a higher probability of relief aid.       
 
6.2. Robustness  tests   
We conducted some additional tests which are not reported in the text, but can be 
obtained from the authors upon request to check the robustness of our results.  First, we tried 
to verify our findings on the determinants of aid on the smaller sub-sample of 47 communes 
that are situated in the districts on which we have precipitation data.  As there are some 
problems due to the small sample size and a lack of variation in the independent variables 
Transport_facility and Major_Rav, we could only focus on the effect of certain economic, 
media, and political variables in the cyclone-affected areas.  We considered areas with any 
rainfall increase compared to last year as affected by the cyclone.  The results confirm our   26  
earlier findings and show that in cyclone-affected areas the likelihood of relief was 
significantly higher in richer areas and in communes with higher radio coverage.  
Second, to show that our results capture a causal effect of economics, radio, and 
politics rather than unobserved variation in other local characteristics, we included three 
additional variables as controls.  One might argue that not only radio, but also television had 
an impact on relief allocation decisions.  Therefore, we included a dummy variable for 
television access (TV_access) in our analyses.
28  There was no significant effect on the results 
and TV_access was not found to be important.     
Disaster relief operations require certain logistics and facilities.  It could be argued 
that they are better developed in areas with availability of potable water or electricity.  We 
created a Water variable, i.e. a dummy variable with value one if there is potable water in the 
commune, either provided by the national energy and water company, JIRAMA, or by 
another provider; and zero otherwise.  An Electricity dummy equals one if there is electricity 
in the commune; and zero otherwise.  Overall, 54% of the communes has access to potable 
water and 21% has electricity.  The results of this analysis suggest that the presence of these 
facilities did not have an impact on relief, while our earlier findings remain the same.  As 
there could be some concern of multicollinearity of both variables with population density or 
average wealth in the commune, we excluded the latter variables from the analyses.  Still, the 
variables were not found to be significant and there was no important effect on the results. 
Last, using the CNS impact code that ranges from 0 to 3 as our cyclone impact 
measure led to the same findings.   
In summary, our results based on aid allocations at communal level convincingly 
show that the likelihood of aid in the aftermath of Gafilo was higher in areas with a higher 
need for intervention.  Moreover, aid was determined by economic, media, and political 
                                                 
28 Overall, 42% of the communes had access to the national television station in 2001.  However, this variable 
suffers from overestimation as during our field interviews we discovered that some rural areas only receive a 
very unclear broadcasting signal.        27  
variables.  The likelihood of relief from the donor organizations was higher in wealthier 
cyclone-affected communes.  In addition, the probability of government aid was higher in 
cyclone-affected communes with higher radio coverage and stronger political support for the 
government.  Unconditional on need, our data suggest that aid was allocated to poorer and 
easier accessible communities.    
 
7. Conclusions   
This paper sheds light on the targeting of relief aid in the aftermath of natural 
disasters. While relatively more aid is being given through these relief aid actions to 
developing countries (Hoddinott, 1998), there are relatively few studies on the efficiency and 
targeting of these interventions (e.g. Owens et al., 2003). Our study contributes to this lack of 
knowledge. We investigate the political economy of relief aid allocation after cyclone Gafilo 
hit Madagascar in March 2004 using unique nationally representative data from 249 
communes at the end of 2004.   
The analyses in this paper highlight five key findings.  First, the likelihood of 
government and aid agency relief was higher in cyclone-affected areas.  This finding is robust 
when using different impact assessments, including information from 15 weather stations 
across the country as well as satellite and wind speed data regarding the cyclone path. 
However, we also find that a number of communes that were not affected by the cyclone 
received aid and some communes that were seriously affected by the cyclone did not receive 
aid at all. This puts into question targeting mechanisms used in relief assistance.  
Second, in cyclone-affected communes, donor-provided relief allocation is found to 
be more likely in relatively richer areas which is probably driven by the fact that richer 
communes have better developed response mechanisms as they have more financial means to 
develop and invest in infrastructure and facilities that are required for relief operations.  In   28  
contrast, in regions not affected by the cyclone, donor-provided relief allocation is found to 
be more likely in poorer areas which could be due to the fact that this relief was provided by 
NGOs that were already active in certain poorer areas of Madagascar before the cyclone and 
these NGOs did not have the capacity or financial means to swiftly move their operations to 
the affected regions after the cyclone.  Hence, in order to reach poorer and affected areas in 
the aftermath of natural disasters, targeting would need to be improved.        
Third, in cyclone-affected communes, government relief was determined by the mass 
media.  We find that the likelihood of receiving aid from the government was higher in 
affected communes with higher radio coverage.  This evidence underlines the importance of 
independent mass media in order to enhance government activism in the aftermath of natural 
disasters. 
Fourth, our results suggest that the government targeted relief to cyclone-affected 
areas with stronger political support for the ruling administration in previous elections.   
However, this finding should be interpreted with caution and several explanations are 
possible.  For example, communes with stronger political support for the incumbent put more 
trust in the government and therefore are more likely to reports problems and request 
assistance.  Conversely, this result could indicate that the Government of Madagascar 
targeted relief disproportionally to favored regions as a reward (e.g., Jayne et al., 2001).       
Finally, our data indicate that aid was also allocated to  easier accessible communities 
that were not affected by the cyclone.  While in a country like Madagascar where poverty is 
endemic and excessive coverage is not really a major concern, it might however indicate 
fungibility of relief aid in that certain non-affected communities received relief at the expense 
of affected ones.       29  
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Table 1: Impact assessments and relief after cyclone Gafilo 
  (a) CNS Impact Code 
  0 = No  1 = Moderate  2 = Serious  3 = Very serious 
Number of communes  56  156  30  7 
Percentage of communes (%)  22  63  12  3 
% of communes that received 
government relief  14 34  47  57 
% of communes that received 
aid agency relief   18 45  70  86 
% of communes that received 
relief from other sources   0 9  20  0 
% of communes that did not 
receive any relief   75 33  10  14 
 (b)  Cyclone Path  – Dummy 
  No  impact   Impact  
Number of communes  191  58 
Percentage of communes (%)  77  23 
% of communes that received 
government relief  28 43 
% of communes that received 
aid agency relief  36 66 
% of communes that received 
relief from other sources  6 14 
% of communes that did not 
receive any relief  46 17 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation between impact assessments and precipitation data at district level 
  CNS Impact  






(0 to 3) 
Cyclone Path  
Dummy 
Precipitation   0.51* 0.30 0.50* 0.25  0.77*** 
Note: Significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***. 
 
Table 3: Impact assessments and precipitation data: results of analyses at district level 
  CNS Impact
0  CNS Serious Impact 
  Outcome 0  Outcome 1  Outcome 2  Outcome 3  Dummy 








  0.0023* 
(1.68) 
No. observations  15  15 
Pseudo R2  0.134  0.273 
Note: 
0 The z-value is 2.29 and hence overall precipitation is significant at the 5-percent level; This table reports 
marginal effects; Significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***. 
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Table 4: Cyclone impact and relief per province (in % of communes) 
  Serious Impact -
Dummy 








Madagascar  15 23 32 43 57 
Per province       
Antananarivo 0  0  55  35  67 
Fianarantsoa 0  4  21  35  44 
Toamasina  12 12 15 64 70 
Mahajanga  50 90 43 63 77 
Toliara 20 38 23 30 38 
Antsiranana  43 43 17 52 52 
Note: Total relief equals one if the commune received relief from the government and/or the aid agencies in the 
aftermath of cyclone Gafilo; Source: Commune Survey, Ilo, 2004 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Unit  Mean  Med. St.  dev. Max.  Min.  Obs. 
Cyclone Impact  
Precipitation  Percent  150.24  150.10 82.27 316.15 32.04  47 
Serious Impact  Dummy  0.15 0.00 0.36 1.00 0.00 249 
Cyclone Path   Dummy  0.23 0.00 0.42 1.00 0.00 249 
Determinants of Relief 
A. Economic  
Pop_density  1000 Inhab/km
2  0.19    0.05 0.76 7.05 0.01 245 
Mean_exp  1000  FMg  301.17 281.24 102.55 926.23 163.67  247 
Remoteness  Index -0.03  -0.28  0.84  6.85  -0.66  249 
Transport_facility  Dummy  0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 247 
B. Media  
Radio_coverage  Percent  46.68 50.00 28.43  100.00 0.00  249 
C. Political  
Major_president  Dummy  0.36 0.00 0.48 1.00 0.00 234 
Protestant  Percent  29.14 30.00 18.67 90.00  0.00  247 
Control Variables 
TV_access  Dummy  0.42 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 248 
Water  Dummy  0.54 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 249 
Electricity  Dummy  0.21 0.00 0.41 1.00 0.00 249 
 
Table 6: Geographical distribution of radio coverage (in % of population) 
  Mean Median  St.  dev. Max.  Min.  Obs. 
Madagascar  46.68 50.00 28.43  100.00 0.00  249 
Per  province        
Antananarivo  54.70 60.00 25.86 95.00  0.00  66 
Fianarantsoa 39.51  40.00 25.95 90.00  1.00  57 
Toamasina  52.88 50.00 23.77 95.00  8.00  33 
Mahajanga  64.27 72.50 23.27  100.00  20.00  30 
Toliara  24.60 10.00 28.82  100.00 0.00  40 
Antsiranana  47.96 40.00 26.81 90.00  5.00  23 
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Table 7: Perceived power of the media/radio on government responsiveness 
Nov/Dec 2004  % of answers of focus groups to the questions:  
 
Percent  
Probably Maybe Probably  not  Total 
1/ ‘In case of a cyclone, do you believe that the radio will report on the local impact/damage?’ 
Madagascar   71  13  16  100 
2/ ‘In case of a cyclone, will you contact the media/radio and report on the local impact/damage?’ 
Madagascar   82  13  5  100 
3/ ‘In case of a cyclone, do you believe that those radio reports improve government responsiveness?’ 
Madagascar   50  41  9  100 
Antananarivo 64  29  7  100 
Fianarantsoa 30  65  5  100 
Toamasina 76  24  0  100 
Mahajanga 70  17  13  100 
Toliara 10 65  25  100 
Antsiranana 70  30  0  100 
Source: Commune survey, Ilo, 2004 
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Table 8: Total (government and/or aid agencies) assistance: Probit regression results 
  (1) dF/dx 
  (2) dF/dx 
  (3) dF/dx  (4) dF/dx 
  (5) dF/dx 







Impact (Cyclone Path)          0.4060*** 
(3.04) 
  -0.6561** 
(-2.10) 






Mean_exp       -0.0010** 
(-2.18) 
    -0.0015*** 
(-2.73) 
      -0.0014** 
(-2.53) 




   0.0617 
(1.21) 
Transport_facility        0.2619*** 
(4.04) 
    0.2776*** 
(3.89) 
      0.3062*** 
(4.10) 






















Impact*Mean_exp         0.0029** 
(2.09) 
      0.0025*** 
(2.59) 








Impact*Radio_coverage     0.0087* 
(1.66) 
     0.0088** 
(2.36) 
Impact*Major_president    
~ 
   0.3719* 
(1.89) 




Provincial  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No.  observations  249 227 221 249 227 
Pseudo  R2  0.103 0.184 0.190 0.115 0.231 
Note: 
~ The interaction term Impact*Major_president predicts outcome 1 perfectly and therefore the variable is 
dropped and 6 observations are not used; dF/dx reports marginal effects and, by default, the discrete change in 
the probability for dummy variables; results with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on districts; z-
statistics are reported in parentheses; significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***. 
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Table 9: Assistance after cyclone Gafilo: Probit analyses – robustness tests 
  Marginal Effect 
A. Government assistance 
Precipitation    0.0017** 
(2.46) 
Provincial Dummies  No 
No. observations  47 
Pseudo R2  0.132 
B. Aid Agencies assistance (i.e. FID and/or NGO assistance) 
Precipitation  0.0014* 
(1.68) 
Provincial Dummies  No 
No. observations  47 
Pseudo R2  0.049 
 
Table 10: Government assistance: Probit regression results 
  (1) dF/dx  (2) dF/dx  (3) dF/dx  (4) dF/dx  (5) dF/dx 
Impact (Serious Impact)   0.3784*** 
(3.01) 
   0.4847*** 
(3.81) 
  -0.4493* 
(-1.88) 
  
Impact (Cyclone Path)        0.3914*** 
(3.29) 
   -0.2865 
(-1.23) 
Pop_density       -0.0249 
(-0.61) 
  -0.0214 
(-0.55) 
    -0.0236 
(-0.64) 
Mean_exp        -0.0008** 
(-2.00) 
  -0.0007 
(-1.44) 
    -0.0005 
(-1.04) 
Remoteness       0.1022** 
(2.10) 
   0.1208** 
(2.26) 
       0.1586** 
(2.31) 
Transport_facility         0.1643*** 
(2.65) 
   0.1588** 
(2.43) 
       0.2209*** 
(3.26) 










   -0.1343 
(-0.95) 






















Impact*Radio_coverage         0.0116** 
(2.02) 
     0.0067** 
(2.05) 
Impact*Major_president           0.7162** 
(2.42) 
       0.6518** 
(2.54) 
Impact*Protestant           0.0170*** 
(3.46) 
       0.0102** 
(2.45) 
Provincial  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No.  observations  249 227 227 249 227 
Pseudo  R2  0.132 0.225 0.286 0.133 0.308 
Note: dF/dx reports marginal effects and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables; 
results with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on districts; z-statistics are reported in parentheses; 
significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***.    
Table 11: Aid agencies assistance: Probit regression results 
  (1) dF/dx  (2) dF/dx  (3) dF/dx  (4) dF/dx  (5) dF/dx 
Impact (Serious Impact)    0.3385*** 
(2.65) 





Impact (Cyclone Path)          0.3718** 
(2.49) 
  -0.5737* 
(-1.65) 
Pop_density       0.0118 
(0.22) 
  0.0240 
(0.45) 
     0.0246 
(0.46) 
Mean_exp      -0.0007 
(-1.53) 
    -0.0013** 
(-2.19) 
      -0.0013** 
(-2.02) 
Remoteness        -0.1012* 
(-1.68) 




Transport_facility        0.2413*** 
(3.26) 
   0.2616*** 
(3.30) 
     0.2994*** 
(3.61) 




   0.0003 
(0.16) 




   -0.0850 
(-0.63) 










Impact*Mean_exp         0.0026** 
(1.97) 
     0.0026** 
(2.24) 
















Impact*Protestant     0.0134 
(1.60) 
       0.0158** 
(2.08) 
Provincial  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No.  observations  249 227 227 249 227 
Pseudo  R2  0.082 0.152 0.181 0.088 0.190 
Note: Dependent variable equals one if the commune received assistance from aid agencies after cyclone Gafilo; 
dF/dx reports the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable 
and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables; results with robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering on districts; z-statistics are reported in parentheses; significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 
percent are represented by *, ** and ***. 
    
Table 12: Total (government and/or aid agencies) assistance: Results of robustness tests 
 Marginal  Effect 
Sample of areas with cyclone impact (precipitation>100%) 
Precipitation  -0.0009 
(-0.40) 
Pop_density  1.2831 
(0.71) 
Mean_exp     0.0045** 
(2.16) 
Remoteness  0.0650 
(0.96) 
Radio_coverage     0.0115*** 
(3.13) 
Protestant   0.0043 
(0.44) 
Provincial Dummies  Yes 
No. observations  31 
Pseudo R2  0.444 
Note: Results with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the districts; z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses; significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent are represented by *, ** and ***. 

























Figure 1: Government and aid agency relief after cyclone Gafilo with  


























Figure 2: Government and aid agency relief after cyclone Gafilo  
with impact according to the cyclone path impact assessment codes 
 
    
ANNEX  
A.1. Impact assessment of cyclone Gafilo in Madagascar – Source: OCHA    
A.2. Impact assessment of cyclone Gafilo in Madagascar – Source: CNS    
A.3. Districts with rainfall stations in Madagascar    
A.4. Cyclone path and impact assessments  
 
Note: CNS Impact Dummy B refers to the Serious Impact Dummy    
A.5. Data description 
Total assistance = dummy variable which equals one if the commune received aid after cyclone 
Gafilo from the Government of Madagascar and/or the aid agencies (Source: Commune Survey, 
2004).  
 
Government assistance = dummy variable which equals one if the commune received emergency aid 
from the government in the aftermath of cyclone Gafilo (Source: Commune Survey, 2004). 
 
Aid agencies assistance = dummy variable which equals one if the respective aid agencies (FID 
and/or local or international NGOs) provided assistance as cash-for-work programs and/or aid to 
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of public facilities in the aftermath of cyclone Gafilo (CS, 
2004). 
 
Precipitation = the % increase in precipitation at the time of cyclone Gafilo (March 2004) compared 
to the precipitation one year earlier i.e. in March 2003 (Sources: CRU, Univ. of East-Anglia). 
 
CNS Impact Code = cyclone impact code, created by the National Disaster Management Agency of 
Madagascar, that ranges from 0 to 3. Zero stands for no cyclone damage, 1 for moderate damage, 
2 for serious damage, and 3 for very serious cyclone damage (Source: CNS, 2006). 
 
(CNS) Any Impact = dummy variable which equals one if the CNS Impact Code equals one, two or 
three; and zero otherwise (Source: CNS, 2006). 
 
(CNS) Serious Impact = dummy variable which equals one if the CNS Impact Code equals two or 
three; and zero otherwise (Source: CNS, 2006). 
 
OCHA Impact Code = cyclone impact code, created by OCHA, that ranges from 0 to 3. Zero stands 
for no cyclone damage, 1 for moderate damage, 2 for serious damage, and 3 for very serious 
cyclone damage (Sources: OCHA, 2006; Relief Web, 2006).  
 
Cyclone Path = dummy variable that equals one if the cyclone passed by the commune or district 
based on satellite images and wind speeds; and zero otherwise (Source: UNISYS, 2006).  
 
Pop_density = population density in the commune (Source: Commune Census, 2001). 
 
Mean_exp = average household expenditures per commune per month (Population Census, 1993). 
 
Remoteness = commune remoteness index that is the outcome of a factor analysis of various isolation 
measures collected in the commune census of 2001. By construction, the index permits us to rank 
communes by degree of isolation (Source: Stifel et al., 2003).   
 
Transport_facility = dummy variable with value one if there is a taxi-bus transport facility/stop in the 
commune; and zero otherwise (Source: Commune Survey, 2004). 
 
Radio_coverage = % of the population in the commune that listened to the radio in November 2001 
i.e. before the presidential elections (Source: Commune Survey, 2004). 
 
Major_president = dummy variable with value one if more than 50% of the electorate voted for the 
president, Marc Ravalomanana, during the presidential elections in 2001 (G.O.M., 2004). 
 
Protestant = percentage of Protestants in the commune in 1990, according to the focus groups (CS, 
04) 
 
TV_access = dummy variable with value one if there was access to a TV outlet in the commune in 
November 2001; and zero otherwise (Source: CS 2004). 
 
Water = dummy variable with value one if there is potable water in the commune, either provided by 
the public water company, or by another provider; and zero otherwise (CS, 2004). 
 
Electricity = dummy variable with value one if there is electricity in the commune; and zero otherwise 
(CS, 2004). 